Office: DM 319C
My research investigates issues of information disclosure, information verifiability and legal institutions. In particular, I develop game-theoretic models of contract, which focus on incentives to produce hard evidence. These models are motivated by real-world institutional and technological constraints. Understanding the effects of these constraints is important for the design of contracts and legal institutions. My ongoing research also concerns dispute resolution and the design of the dispute resolution process.
Costly Evidence and Systems of Fact-Finding, Bulletin of Economic Research, 61:103-125 (2009).
Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost, Contributions in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 8 : No. 1 (2008), Article 15.
Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability, Topics in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 8 : No. 1 (2008), Article 18.
Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design [with Joel Watson], Games and Economic Behavior, 58: 75-93 (2007).
Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability [with Joel Watson], Journal of Economic Theory, 118:1-31 (2004).