2018 FIU CUBAPoll

HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA

Steven J. Green
School of International & Public Affairs
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FOREWORD

On December 17, 2014—a date now remembered as D17—President Barack Obama surprised the world when he announced the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba and the beginning of a series of policy shifts to expand U.S. political, social, economic, and cultural engagement with Cuba. The shift in policy has had a lasting impact on U.S.-Cuba relations as well as on the experiences of Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits. Since the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States, however, a much less sanguine view about the future of U.S.-Cuba relations has become the norm.

The 2018 FIU Cuba Poll is the first one conducted after Trump’s inauguration. Relations between the two countries since the last poll have not followed the path of engagement established by Obama. While few of the specific policies initiated during the presidency of Obama have been replaced, the “sonic incidents” reported by U.S. embassy personnel in Havana on August 2017, unleashed a series of reactions from the Trump administration. The result is the current freeze of consular activity in the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the creation of a list of hotels and restaurants out of bounds for American travelers and the issuing of a travel advisory for U.S. travelers to the island. Relations between the two countries have become icy at best.

In the foreword to the previous poll we stated that the thawing of relations championed by Obama “had a great impact on the way Cuban Americans view the relations between the United States and Cuba.” This year, it is likely that the freezing of relations and the intensification of a more negative narrative have had a similar impact on the Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

The findings of the poll suggest that there is a retrenchment of traditional hard-line views towards U.S.-Cuban relations. While political and social engagement is still strongly favored, support for the wielding of the “stick” of the embargo—the economic isolation of Cuba from the U.S. economic relations—has increased among Cuban Americans as a whole. The more recent arrivals (after 1995) and the second and third generation of Cuban Americans are driving the currents of change while more established residents insist on a tougher stand. The retrenchment might be driven by the slow pace of change on the island, even while the old-guard leadership fades, or by the hostile national narrative that currently surrounds U.S.-Cuba relations in the United States. Whatever the reason, the demographics of the Cuban-American community in South Florida continue to change while many of their attitudes directed at the state-to-state relations between the U.S. and their homeland remain laden with contradictions.

Various units within Florida International University contributed to funding the 2018 FIU Cuba poll. Along with the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, these units include the Office of the President, the Cuban Research Institute and the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center. We appreciate their generous support of the poll.

Finally, we would like to take this opportunity to once again recognize the co-principal investigators, Drs. Guillermo J. Grenier and Hugh Gladwin, for more than two decades of research and analysis on the public opinions of the Cuban-American community in South Florida. We would also like to acknowledge the collaboration of the staff members of the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, especially Pedro Botta and Amy Ellis.

John F. Stack, Jr., Ph.D.
Founding Dean
Steven J. Green School
of International and Public Affairs

2018 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County are evenly split on their views about the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Half of the population favors the continuation of the embargo and half favors cessation. Opposition to the embargo rises to 65% among Cuban Americans ages 18 to 39. Similarly, 60% of those arriving since 1995 oppose continuing the embargo. Among registered voters, the same 50-50 split is evident. (Figure Cluster 3).
- A majority of respondents favors increasing economic relations with the island. The expansion or maintenance of the existing business relations receives support from 68% of the sample. As in most engagement initiatives measured in the poll, there is a significant split between the views of earlier arrivals (before 1980) and those who left Cuba after 1995. The post-1995 migrants, along with second and third generations not born on the island, are much more likely to support the expansion of business ties (55% and 60% respectively.—Figure Cluster 4).
- Half of the respondents would allow investment by American residents and citizens in the private business enterprises emerging in Cuba. The post-1995 migrants and those born outside of Cuba are more supportive of increasing investment opportunities than the population at large (59% and 69% respectively) while pre-1995 cohorts are dead set against the idea (Figure Cluster 4).
- A large majority (63%) supported the decision to open diplomatic relations with Cuba, with post-1995 arrivals and second and third generation Cuban Americans strongly backing the Obama era policy shift (75% and 77% respectively). Support for the reestablishment of diplomatic ties maintains a solid majority among all age groups up to age 76 and above, after which it drops to a 31% support. A majority (61%) of registered voters express support while this figure balloons to 77% among non-registered voters (Figure Cluster 7).
- A strong majority of respondents (57%) favors the lifting of travel restrictions impeding all Americans from traveling to Cuba. Unsurprisingly, the newer arrivals and those not born on the island lead the charge in supporting unrestricted travel (68% and 69% respectively) while the pre-1980 migrants oppose free travel by almost the same proportion (63%). Approximately 55% of registered voters also favor unrestricted travel by all Americans (Figure Cluster 9).
- A majority of respondents agree with the termination of the “wet foot/dry foot” immigration policy—52% to 41%, with 8% unsure of their views. Those coming after 1980 are lukewarm to the change of policy (only about 40% support its termination) while those leaving Cuba before 1980 and those born outside of Cuba maintain a sturdy base of support for its abolition (64% and 55% respectively—Figure Cluster 8).
- While the population remains Republican in its voter registration (54%), the new arrivals and younger voters are fueling the growth of the Independent, or what the State of Florida officially labels “no party affiliation” registrants (26%). The Republican turnout was a significant factor in the midterm elections. Approximately 70% of Cuban Americans voted for Governor Ron DeSantis, 69% for Senator Rick Scott, and 72% percent of the general vote for Congressional House Representatives was in support of the Republican candidate, even when two of three most significant races (Shalala/Salazar and Curbelo/Marcasel-Powell) were decided for Democrats.
- When asked to list the issues that influence them to vote for a specific candidate, the economy and jobs, health care, gun control and taxes topped the list. A candidate’s position on Cuba ranked dead last in motivating the Cuban-American vote.
INTRODUCTION

For those of us engaged in studying the Cuban-American diaspora in South Florida, the last four years have resulted in a severe case of cognitive whiplash. The historic announcements and policy changes initiated by President Obama on December 17, 2014 encouraged the enthusiastic reevaluation of business, political and personal relationships between the two countries. Organizations of all kinds began to envision ways in which to engage Cuba, often discovering how difficult it is to do business on the island or, as did the airlines, establish unreasonable expectations about the benefits of renewed political ties between the two longtime ideological adversaries. A coterie of state and municipal business leaders from all over the United States rushed to Cuba to gauge the depth of the commitment of the Cuban authorities to engage in economic as well as political relations with the United States.

Cuban Americans in South Florida too reevaluated their future in light of the thawing of relations. Some South Floridians began to consider investing in the island’s growing private sector. Some longtime residents of the United States took the opportunity offered by Cuban law to “repatriate” and gain access to the rights of Cuban residents to buy and sell property, have access to health care and educational opportunities. Eased travel restrictions led to a historic flow of non-Cuban Americans to the island. Cubans recalibrated their daily routines and calculated how to take advantage of the visitors from El Yuma. Some successfully engaged the U.S. visitors as efficiently as the U.S. government was attempting to engage again with Cuba.

The Cuban people spontaneously and warmly welcomed Obama and his family during his March 20–22, 2016 visit and his speech, broadcast throughout the island, was broadly hailed in the streets of towns throughout the island as an elegant and historic reversal of decades of cold war antagonisms and acrimony. The beginning of Obama’s long game started off on the right foot. The U.S. was no longer “the enemy.” Alternatives to a future with more pluralist options seemed possible.

The snapshot of the South Florida Cuban-American community provided by the FIU Cuba Poll conducted in August of 2016 captured a sense of optimism and an overwhelming support for the Obama initiatives. That was then, and this is now. The mood of the community has changed in the last two years. President Trump, acting as unilaterally as Obama did in opening relations, has applied a tourniquet to the flow of goodwill between the two countries. This change in the national narrative and policy initiatives has had a real impact on the Cuban-American community represented by our poll. Today, we see a retrenchment of traditional positions of isolation rather than the anticipation of engagement. We see a community divided on the issue of the embargo while still willing to maintain and even expand the business relationships established as a result of the Obama initiatives. The community still wants unrestricted travel to the island, a right that Cuban Americans have had for years, to become available to all Americans. The new arrivals and second and third generation Cuban Americans express a strong desire to continue the engagement trends but engaging the young and the new arrivals in the political processes necessary to institutionalize change is a challenge.

Large majorities voted for DeSantis and Scott for statewide office and the Republican Party holds on to its slight majority among registered voters (54%). The Democratic Party is not making great inroads but independent voters who sometimes behave like Democrats, are growing. And what we discover in this poll, perhaps to no one’s surprise, is that Cuban Americans, when engaged in politics, are Americans first and Cubans second. When asked to list the issues that motivate a vote for a specific candidate, American Cubans list as their priorities the economy and jobs, health care, gun control. The second and third generations include immigration as an issue that their parents and grandparents barely register. A candidate’s position on Cuba ranks eighth on the list. Puts this entire Cuba Poll thing in context, doesn’t it?

Almost three decades of polling the community has taught us a great deal. The Cuban-American population is far from homogenous and its heterogeneity spans social, cultural, economic, and political dimensions. There are Cubans and there are Cubans. The more recent arrivals are poorer, more
racially diverse, and, like the second and third generations, more inclined to support policies of engagement with the island. These more conciliatory voices are expressing their desire to promote change just as much as those advocating isolationist policies.

Many of the trends that we have identified in past polls remain significant. Those migrants who experienced the seismic changes brought about by the 1959 Revolution are more likely to express support for the isolationist policies codified in U.S. policy toward Cuba. This wave of exiles is diminishing in numbers but perhaps not in influence. Subsequent waves of immigrants, particularly those arriving after the 1995 immigration agreement signed by representatives of the two countries, are increasing their demographic significance within the community and their members express more of a willingness to increase contact between Cubans here and there.

The once almost monolithic control of the Republican Party on registered Cuban-American voters is also affected by the growing migrant waves. From a dominance of 70% in the early 1990s, registered Republicans have declined to approximately 54% of the population in the current poll. Yet, as the midterm election vote presented in this report shows, the earliest arrivals still remain the most loyal and dependable of Republican voters. The new arrival waves and the rising tide of second and third generation Cuban Americans are floating the boats of the Democratic Party and, more significantly, the rolls of independents in the region but their impact in elections remains uncertain.

To clarify the trends and changes in the Cuban-American population of South Florida, in this poll we divide the respondents into three main immigrant waves: before 1980, from 1980 to 1994, and from 1995 to the present. We also report the results by place of birth (Cuba/U.S.-born), age and voter registration status. The last chart in most of the key questions views the population in a dichotomous way: those arriving before 1979 and all the other migrants as well as the second and third generation respondents. Here we see the initial opinion divide which is deepening in the population between the “exilio historico” and its coattails with new migrations that researchers often view as less political and more economic in nature. In some questions, we include the category of “Don’t Know” to ensure that we do not undervalue ambivalence or indecision among respondents. Our purpose is to understand, not to obscure, the opinions of the surveyed population.

This poll continues the tradition started over two decades ago. We remain curious about how the Cuban-American community views U.S.-Cuba relations. We are aware of the heterogeneity of the community and are becoming more accustomed to hearing its many voices. This survey shows that members of the Cuban diaspora in Miami-Dade County have diverse views about how they would like the U.S. government to deal with the Cuban state. Some remain convinced that the changes they desire will come to Cuba only by isolating it from its diaspora and the U.S. government. Some would like to continue at least some elements of the new course charted since D17.

What remains clear is that Cuba inspires debate and passions in all Cubans. Those who came to the United States immediately after the Revolution comprise an increasingly smaller percentage of the population, but their influence remains strong even as their ideas are transformed and reinterpreted by newer migrants from the island. Our poll preserves a record of the continuity and change occurring in the Cuban-American community in South Florida. It is a record of a transition and tradition as dramatic and far-reaching as the transitions occurring on the island. This is our South Florida transition and it is happening daily, whether a poll is taken to witness its dynamics or not. Whatever is to come, it is likely that the South Florida Cuban-American community, its newcomers as well as its established residents, will have a say in shaping the future of Cuba, as well as the future of U.S.-Cuba relations.

Guillermo J. Grenier, Ph.D.
Professor
Hugh Gladwin, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies
Florida International University
THE POLLSTERS

Guillermo J. Grenier is Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. Born in Havana, Cuba, Dr. Grenier is one of the founders of the Miami school of social analysis, and has authored or coauthored seven books and dozens of articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation, and Cuban-American ideological profiles, particularly in the Greater Miami area. His books include *A History of Little Havana*, with Corinna J. Moebius (2015); *This Land Is Our land: Newcomers and Established Residents in Miami*, with Alex Stepick, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn (2003); *The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States*, with Lisandro Pérez (2002); *Newcomers in the Workplace: Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. Economy*, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick (1994); and *Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change*, edited with Alex Stepick (1992). Dr. Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a Faculty Fellow of the University of Notre Dame’s Institute of Latino Studies, as well as Director of the Florida Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures nationally and internationally on his research. He received his Ph.D. in sociology and his M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.

Hugh Gladwin is the past director of the Institute for Public Opinion Research and former Associate Professor in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. His major area of research is the application of survey research and GIS tools to understand large urban settings of high cultural and demographic diversity. Within that framework, a particular interest is to better model the interactions between the human population and natural systems such as the South Florida ecosystem and natural events like hurricanes and climate change. He is a coeditor (with Walter Gillis Peacock and Betty Hearn Morrow) and contributor to the book *Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the Sociology of Disaster* (1997) and author of numerous publications and presentations on disaster mitigation, public health, and public opinion, especially among Cuban Americans. Along with Arthur Heise, he directed the FIU/Florida Poll, which tracked public opinion statewide from 1988 to 2006. He is a research scientist in the Florida Coastal Everglades Long-Term Ecological Research project (FCE-LTER). In Miami-Dade County, Dr. Gladwin serves as a member of the Steering Committee of the Local Mitigation Strategy and was appointed by the County Commission to be on the county Climate Change Advisory Task Force. He is also a member of the Socioeconomic Working Group of the NOAA Hurricane Forecast Improvement Project. He holds a Ph.D. in anthropology from Stanford University.
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This survey examines how Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County, Florida, view current U.S.-Cuba policy. To appraise trends in the community we ask many of the same questions we have asked for more than 20 years. We measure support for the embargo as well as changing individual interests associated with U.S.-Cuba policy, such as travel restrictions, trade and investment opportunities, diplomatic engagement, and U.S. immigration policy. We also measure support for political candidates who might be willing to propose changes in the embargo in exchange for policies that favor the strengthening of small businesses and human rights on the island. The poll carefully documents the respondents' demographic characteristics and how they relate to their attitudes toward U.S.-Cuba relations.

The 2018 FIU Cuba Poll was conducted between November 14 and December 1, 2018. It was administered to a random sample of 1,001 Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County, ages 18 and over. The sample was generated from telephone exchanges using standard random-digit-dialing procedures to ensure that each phone number has an equal chance of being chosen for the sample. Interviews were conducted with respondents either by landline or cell phones (250 by landline, 751 by cell phone). Bilingual interviewers conducted the survey in Spanish and English, depending on the respondents' preference (69% of the interviews were completed in Spanish). The countywide margin of error is plus or minus 3.1% at the 95% confidence level.

The poll carefully documents the respondents' demographic characteristics and how they relate to their attitudes toward U.S.-Cuba relations.
MAIN FINDINGS

This section presents the responses to key questions of the poll. The exact wording for selected questions, along with the Spanish version, is included in Appendix 2.

Anticipating More Changes

When asked when major political changes were likely to occur in Cuba, 38% of respondents said that changes would never occur in Cuba, while 12% believe that changes are occurring now or will within one year.

The answer to this question, which we have been asking first for over 20 years, rather than being an off-the-cuff response, always seems to be a result of the mood of the times. In the 2016 poll, 15% felt that changes were occurring or would occur within one year. This optimism has been bumped down a year in the current poll as an increased number estimated a 2-5-year time horizon for major political changes to occur. Frustrated pessimism has increased by 4% as well (the Never category), slightly above the margin of error of both polls. Some patterns remain the same, however, as the earlier arrivals express more pessimism and the more recent arrivals more optimism. Nearly half, 46% of pre-1980 migrants, said that changes would never occur, as did 57% of the 1980–94 cohort and 41% of the post-1995 cohorts. The most optimistic respondents were the second and third generation respondents. About 14% of these respondents believe that changes are occurring now or will within one year and 18% are keeping an eye on political change occurring within the next 2-5 years. Younger cohorts are consistently more optimistic than older Cuban Americans who have been to this rodeo before.

Figure Cluster 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When will major political change occur?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When will major political change occur? (by migration/birth)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When will major political change occur? (by age)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Embargo and Economic Relations

Over 80% of Cubans living in Miami-Dade County believe the embargo has not worked.

In general terms, the community is of two minds when it comes to engaging in economic relations with the island. On one hand, they support the existing business relationships established during the Obama period. At the same time, there is a strong retrenchment of support for the embargo—the primary policy in place to isolate the Cuban government from U.S. economic activity. This is the case even when, as has always been the case, the ineffectiveness of the embargo has risen to the level of a truism. We will hold off interpreting this most Cuban-American of contradictions but it is clear that the concepts of the “carrot and the stick” have a safe haven in the Cuban-American psyche.

*Figure Cluster 2*

2a. Has Embargo Worked?

2b. Has Embargo Worked? (by migration/birth)

2c. Has Embargo Worked? (by age)
The Embargo and Economic Relations

The Cuban-American community is evenly split on its opinion about the maintenance or abolition of the economic embargo against Cuba. The pre-1980 migrants lead the opposition to lifting the embargo.

The population is evenly split: 51% support the continuation of the embargo and 49% oppose its continuity. If the respondents expressing ambiguity about their support are included, the population remains split but 11% can be interpreted as being "undecided" in their decision.

As the graph reporting the responses by migration and birth makes evident, there is a clear grouping of proponents and opponents of the embargo. Pre-1995 migrants are more enthusiastic about wielding the economic stick of the embargo while the post-1995 migrants and second and third generation Cuban Americans are less enamored with the policy. Younger Cuban Americans ages 18 to 39 are the most adamant opponents of the embargo (65%). Approximately 52% of registered voters support the maintenance of the embargo while an equal number (53%) of non-registered voters support its elimination.

The last figure highlights the division between the pre-1979 Cuban Americans and the subsequent populations of migrants and those born outside Cuba. While 68% of pre-1959 migrants support the embargo, 56% of other Cuban Americans are in favor of its removal. As we explain in the discussion section, when we compare the attitudes towards the embargo expressed by the pre-1980 migrants in the 2016 FIU Cuba Poll with the current responses, we can see that the shift towards a “harder line” on the embargo is led by these respondents. The pre-1980 migrants in the 2016 poll supported the embargo by 57%. In the 2018 measurement of this opinion, this same cohort supports the embargo by 68%. Meanwhile, the “Other Cuban Americans,” i.e. those who migrated after 1980 or were born outside of Cuba, maintained steady support for the embargo (45.2% in 2016 and 44.5% in 2018). (See Figure 20.a)
Most respondents favor expanding or maintaining the economic relations between companies in the United States and the island.

A majority of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County (68%) support the expansion or maintenance of business relations with Cuba by U.S. companies. Newer arrivals do so in overwhelmingly greater numbers than pre-1980 arrivals (60% of the former want an expansion of economic relations while only 25% of the latter do) and younger respondents are more supportive than older respondents. Approximately 66% of registered voters support a maintenance or expansion of economic relations and an impressive 80% of non-registered voters do the same. The divide between the pre-1979 migrants and other Cuban Americans is a perfect dichotomy, as can be seen in Figure 4.e.

As has been the case for many years, an overwhelming majority of the respondents endorse the selling of food (70%) and medicine (75%) (See Figure Clusters 5 and 6).
The Embargo and Economic Relations

Seventy percent support the sale of food products to Cuba by U.S. companies

*Figure Cluster 5*

**5a** Support for Food Sales by U.S. Companies

- Strongly Favor: 23%
- Mostly Favor: 49%
- Mostly Oppose: 7%
- Strongly Oppose: 21%

**5b** Support for Food Sales by U.S. Companies (by migration/birth)

- **Before 1980**
  - Strongly Favor: 57%
  - Mostly Favor: 51%
  - Mostly Oppose: 12%
  - Strongly Oppose: 10%

- **1980 to 1994**
  - Strongly Favor: 57%
  - Mostly Favor: 28%
  - Mostly Oppose: 13%
  - Strongly Oppose: 12%

- **1995 to 2018**
  - Strongly Favor: 28%
  - Mostly Favor: 22%
  - Mostly Oppose: 13%
  - Strongly Oppose: 15%

- **Not born in Cuba**
  - Strongly Favor: 41%
  - Mostly Favor: 16%
  - Mostly Oppose: 12%
  - Strongly Oppose: 8%

**5c** Support for Food Sales by U.S. Companies (by age)

- 18-39
  - Strongly Favor: 31%
  - Mostly Favor: 43%
  - Mostly Oppose: 12%
  - Strongly Oppose: 2%

- 40-59
  - Strongly Favor: 47%
  - Mostly Favor: 30%
  - Mostly Oppose: 12%
  - Strongly Oppose: 5%

- 60-75
  - Strongly Favor: 29%
  - Mostly Favor: 30%
  - Mostly Oppose: 12%
  - Strongly Oppose: 15%

- 76 and Older
  - Strongly Favor: 45%
  - Mostly Favor: 21%
  - Mostly Oppose: 15%
  - Strongly Oppose: 2%

**5d** Support for Food Sales by U.S. Companies (by voter registration)

- Registered
  - Strongly Favor: 46%
  - Mostly Favor: 21%
  - Mostly Oppose: 7%
  - Strongly Oppose: 5%

- Not Registered
  - Strongly Favor: 56%
  - Mostly Favor: 24%
  - Mostly Oppose: 17%
  - Strongly Oppose: 12%
Seventy five percent support the sale of medical items to Cuba by U.S. companies.

Figure Cluster 6

Support Medical Sales by U.S. Companies

6a

Support for Medical Sales by U.S. Companies (by age)

6b

Support for Medical Sales by U.S. Companies (by migration/birth)

6c

Support for Medical Sales by U.S. Companies (by voter registration)

6d
Policy Changes and Continuity

While the Trump administration has altered very few of the Obama initiatives, a dramatic shift in the tone of the relations between the two countries has occurred. The national narrative towards Cuba is one of hostility rather than engagement; confrontation rather than negotiation. According to the administration, Cuba has conducted an unspecified, high tech “sonic attack” on U.S. Embassy personnel in Havana. The categorization of the event as an “attack,” rather than a public health concern, along with the lack of information available about the nature of the incident, justified placing a travel warning on the country to advise travelers of the apparent random risks that they face if they chose to exercise their limited rights to travel to Cuba. Also justified is the reduction of embassy personnel in Havana to the point where consular activities are inactive. The travel ban had a chilling effect on U.S. travelers to Cuba and the embassy reductions have had a dramatic impact on Cubans traveling to the United States. Cubans requesting visas to visit relatives in the United States must travel to U.S. embassies in a third country to make an appointment for visa applications. It is in this climate that the Cuban-American diplomatic relations slouch towards some unknown Bethlehem where they will be reshaped into a more hostile, or more hopeful, mold. It is in this climate that our respondents express their views on diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Sixty-three percent of Cubans living in Miami-Dade County expressed support for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

While there seems to be a retrenchment of attitudes towards the embargo as an economic pressure point to bring about change, Cuban Americans are also in favor of maintaining political connections to the island. A strong majority are in favor of the establishment of diplomatic relations. This number is unchanged (within the margin of error) from the 2016 measure of 65% support. Younger Cuban Americans are more supportive than older Cuban Americans, and the newest arrivals are more in favor than the pre-1980 cohort (75% to 41% respectively). Respondents not born in Cuba are strong supporters of diplomatic relations (77%). Approximately 61% of registered voters are in favor of diplomatic relations policies while 77% of those not registered to vote are in support. The split between the pre-1979 and other Cuban Americans is pronounced (see Figure 7.e).
Fifty-two percent of Cubans in Miami-Dade County support the termination of the “wet foot/dry foot” policy.

The population is evenly split on its support for the termination of the wet foot/dry foot policy but only the pre-1980 migrants and the second and third generations are significantly in favor of the abolition of this policy codified in the 1995 immigration agreement and terminated by Obama in January 2017. All age cohorts support the end to the special treatment of Cubans. Fifty-five percent of registered voters support the policy shift. Figure 8.8 highlights the divide between pre-1979 migrants and other Cuban Americans.

**Figure Cluster 8**

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8a. Agree With Termination of WF/DF Policy

8b. Support for Termination of WF/DF Policy (by migration/birth)

8c. Support for Termination of WF/DF Policy (by age)

8d. Support for Termination of WF/DF Policy (by voter registration)

8e. Support for Termination of WF/DF Policy (by 1959-1979 vs Others)
Fifty-seven percent of the respondents favor unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba.

When asked if unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba should be allowed or not, 57% of the respondents answered affirmatively. The support for unrestricted travel is weakest among the pre-1980 cohort (37%) and strongest among the post-1995 cohort (68%) and those not born on the island (69%). A majority of respondents in all age cohorts support opening up travel, except for the 76 and above group (49%). A majority (55%) of registered voters endorse this type of policy initiative. Figure 9.e presents the almost perfect asymmetry between the opinions of pre-1979 arrivals and other Cubans.
Most of the Cuban origin population has not traveled to the island but the newer arrivals continue to maintain linkages with family and communities back home.

Cuban Americans with ties to the island continue to exercise their privileged position of being able to travel to the island whenever they wish. While a large minority, 43%, of Cuban Americans in South Florida have traveled to the island, either since their migration or as second or third generation Cuban Americans, a whopping 75% of post-1995 arrivals have returned for a visit.

**Figure Cluster 10**

**10a** Have Traveled to Cuba

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes Have Traveled</th>
<th>No Have not Traveled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**10b** Have Traveled to Cuba (migration/birth)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes Have Traveled</th>
<th>No Have not Traveled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1980</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 to 1994</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 to 2018</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not born in Cuba</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**10c** Have Traveled to Cuba (by age)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Yes Have Traveled</th>
<th>No Have not Traveled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-39</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-75</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76 and Older</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**10d** Have Traveled to Cuba (by voter registration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter Registration</th>
<th>Yes Have Traveled</th>
<th>No Have not Traveled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Registered</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**10e** Have Traveled to Cuba (by 1959-1979 vs Others)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Yes Have Traveled</th>
<th>No Have not Traveled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other C-A</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1979 migrant</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Policy Changes and Continuity

Sixty-five percent of the respondents support the continuation of “people-to-people” programs.

A large majority of respondents favor the continuation of “people-to-people” travel opportunities currently endorsed by U.S. policy. The post-1995 arrivals do so overwhelmingly (92%) with a majority of all age cohorts, except the oldest, expressing their support. Strong support exists in the population regardless of place of birth. Sixty-nine percent of registered voters favor the policy as well. Figure 11.e highlights the significant difference between the pre-1979 migrants and other Cuban Americans.
Forty percent of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade report sending money to friends or relatives on the island and 36% report sending other items. Forty-five percent of respondents who send remittances report sending to the province of Havana.

Approximately 72% of the post-1995 cohort report sending money to relatives or friends on the island, while only 26% of 1995 migrants and 44% of 1980-1994 migrants do. A majority of respondents 59 years old or younger send money while only a third of those 60 and over send remittances. A quarter of respondents not born on the island send remittances (26%). Respondents who are registered to vote are just as likely to send money remittances as non-registered respondents. Approximately 8% of respondents believe that some of the money or items they have sent to the island has been used to assist in the development of private small business in Cuba. Havana is overwhelmingly the recipient of remittances (45%), with no other province receiving more than 8% of the remittances (Pinar del Rio, 8%).

**Figure Cluster 12**

- **12a** Send Money to Cuba

- **12b** Send Money to Cuba (by migration/birth)

- **12c** Send Money to Cuba (by age)

- **12d** Send Money to Cuba (by voter registration)

- **12e** Send Money to Cuba (1959-1979 vs Others)
Policy Changes and Continuity

Half of the respondents would allow people living in the United States to invest in small businesses in Cuba.

Support for investment options shows a marked decrease from the responses recorded in the 2016 Cuba Poll (57% support) but remains on an upward trend compared to the 2014 measure (14%). The more recent cohorts are the most supportive of the liberalization of investment opportunities; 31.6% of pre-1995 arrivals express support while 58.6% of post-1995 arrivals express support. Sixty-nine percent of respondents not born on the island support opening up investment opportunities. The proportional split is reflected within the ranks of the registered voters, where 49% report supporting a more liberal investment policy. The unregistered respondents are more enthusiastic (57%). Figure 13.e presents evidence that Cuban Americans not arriving in the pre-1979 period are more willing to allow all Americans to invest in Cuba.

Figure Cluster 13

13a Allow U.S. Citizens to Invest in Cuban Business

13b Allow U.S. Citizens to Invest in Cuban Business (by migration/birth)

13c Allow U.S. Citizens to Invest in Cuban Business (by age)

13d Allow U.S. Citizens to Invest in Cuban Business (by voter registration)

13e Allow U.S. Citizens to Invest in Cuban Business (1959-1979 vs Others)
Forty-six percent of Cuban Americans supporting investment on the island would invest in a private enterprise in Cuba.

Pre-1980 arrivals pronounce a resounding “no” to personal investments on the island (66%) while members of the two other waves are more likely to invest. Only second and third generation Cuban Americans appreciate the opportunity in the majority (57%). About half of Cuban Americans not members of the pre-1979 cohort are willing to risk investing in Cuba if given the opportunity (Figure 14.e).
Politics

Fifty-four percent of respondents are registered Republicans, 19% are Democrats, and 26% are Independent.

The new arrivals are more evenly split between the three political preferences; 36% are Republican, 25% Democrat, and 38% are Independent. A strong majority of pre-1980 and 1980–94 arrivals are Republicans (72% and 64%). An impressive 40% of 18–39 year-olds report being independents. Figure 5.d makes clear that a slim majority other Cuban Americans (52%) are either Independent or Democrat. The Republican Party maintains its 70% dominance in the pre-1979 cohort.

Figure Cluster 15

15a

Party Registration

15b

Party Registration (by migration/birth)

15c

Party Registration (by age)

15d

Party Registration (1959-1979 vs Others)
Cuban Americans register and exercise their rights to vote. Of the 88% citizens in the sample, 95% are registered to vote, and 87% reported voting in the midterm election.

The 2018 midterm election motivated the Cuban voter. Even with the expected lower participation by the new arrivals (only 65% are citizens) and the apathy usually associated with the less engaged younger voters (they surprised with 78% turnout), this election cycle turned out the Cuban-American vote. We will present the votes in the major races in the next section, but the sample suggests that the Cuban-American new arrivals are becoming incorporated into the political activities of their new nation, after years of resisting involvement. The 2016 FIU Cuba Poll indicated that 53% of 1995-2016 migrants had received U.S. citizenship. Using the same measure (including all migrants arriving during 1995-to date of the poll), the number of citizens has increased in this poll to 65%.

**Figure Cluster 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Arrivals</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>Citizenship (by migration/birth)</th>
<th>Registered to Vote</th>
<th>Voted in Midterm Election (Registered Voters)</th>
<th>Voted in Midterm Election (By Age)</th>
<th>Voted in Midterm Election (By Gender)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1980</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 to 1994</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 to 2018</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not born in Cuba</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- Yes
- No

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Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
Politics

Yes, Virginia. Cubans still vote Republican. The majority of Cuban Americans cast their vote in support of Ron DeSantis for Governor and Rick Scott for Senate.

The massive turnout evident in the reported figures benefited both Republican and Democratic candidates in a year of tight elections but Republicans received the biggest election “pastelito” from Cuban-American voters.

Seventy percent of Cuban Americans voted for Republican Ron DeSantis. All migration categories went for DeSantis, with the 1995-2018 cohort giving Democrat Andrew Gillum a 35% boost. The second and third generation Cuban Americans made it a horse race, favoring DeSantis with 51% of the vote to Gillum’s 48%. A similar reflection of the youth vote turning out for Gillum can be seen in the age breakdown (Figure 17.c).

The results in the Senate race were nearly identical. Scott received 69% of the Cuban-American vote and Nelson received 30%. In both races women were more likely to vote Democratic than men, as were the younger voters and the second and third generation Cuban Americans. At the end of the day, however, Republican voters turn out and make a difference. Figure 17.e shows that the pre-1979 cohort voted overwhelmingly for DeSantis (84%), the “Other Cuban Americans” did not disappoint the Republican candidate who received 65% of their vote. Nearly identical proportions gave their vote to Rick Scott in his tight race with Bill Nelson (Figure 17.j).
Congressional Vote Pattern

The Congressional vote patterns maintain the heavy Republican profile, as shown in Figure Cluster 18. The overview table of the entire sample is interesting in its distribution, but it should not be confused with an accurate percentage of the vote received by each candidate in individual races within their districts. The respondents who voted for Maria Elvira Salazar could have voted for Donna Shalala but not for Mario Diaz-Balart. Further analysis is required to match up the geography of the voters with the races available to them (we did not ask for the respondent’s Congressional District) as well as deconstructing the “partisan” vote of the voters who reported that they just voted for “the Republican” or “the Democrat.” It is clear, however, that the Cuban American vote went for Maria Elvira Salazar, Mario Diaz-Balart and Carlos Curbelo, even if two of the three lost their races to their rivals.

The second set of tables breaks down the votes by the party receiving them (Democrat/Republican) to see how the Congressional vote was dispersed by age, migration wave and birth and gender. The distribution of the total sample is presented in the pie chart. Approximately 72% of the voters cast a ballot for the Republican candidate in their district. The groups most likely to muster a Democratic resistance are the second and third generation Cuban Americans and women. A third of the women’s vote went to Democratic Congressional candidates. Cuban Americans not arriving before 1979 voted for the Republican candidate with diminished but significant zeal, compared to the pre-1979 cohort (65%-83%- Figure 18.e).

Figure Cluster 18
18b Congressional Vote (by party)

- Republican: 28%
- Democrat: 72%

18c Congressional Vote (by party/migration/birth)

- Before 1980
  - Republican: 80%
  - Democrat: 17%
- 1980 to 1994
  - Republican: 80%
  - Democrat: 30%
- 1995 to 2018
  - Republican: 46%
  - Democrat: 34%
- Not born in Cuba
  - Republican: 73%
  - Democrat: 41%

18d Congressional Vote (by age)

- 18-39
  - Republican: 59%
  - Democrat: 41%
- 40-59
  - Republican: 72%
  - Democrat: 28%
- 60-75
  - Republican: 71%
  - Democrat: 29%
- 76 and Older
  - Republican: 91%
  - Democrat: 9%

18e Congressional Vote (by gender)

- Male
  - Republican: 77%
  - Democrat: 67%
- Female
  - Republican: 23%
  - Democrat: 33%

18f Congressional Vote-Party (1959-1979 vs Others)

- 1959-1979 migrant
  - Republican: 69%
  - Democrat: 31%
- Other C-A
  - Republican: 63%
  - Democrat: 37%
Voting While Cuban: Cuban Americans or American Cubans?

When asked what issues motivate them to cast their vote for a specific candidate, Cuba ranked 8th on the list. Most Cuban Americans are concerned about the same issues that non-Cubans and other Latinos are concerned about: health care and the well being of the economy.

The FIU Cuba Poll emphasizes the attitudes of the Cuban-American community towards U.S.-Cuba policy. We have often asked our respondents the importance of a candidate’s position on Cuba in shaping their voting behavior and have always received tepid responses. This year we asked respondents to tell us the one or two “issues that may have been important to you in your deciding who to vote for in the election.” What are the issues that motivate Cuban Americans to vote for a specific candidate? The responses, perhaps unsurprising to most, clearly reverse the nature of the hyphenated identity of Cuban Americans when it comes to politics. Cubans are embedded in the American socio-political system and as such receive much of the same information as other citizens on which to base their vote during the political season. They are American Cubans and weigh the issues facing the country much like other differently hyphenated Americans.

The top five issues for Cuban Americans, the issues that motivates their vote for a specific candidate, are 1) the economy and jobs, 2) health care, 3) gun control 4) immigration a sometimes distant fourth and 5) taxes/government spending. The top two jockey for position depending on the category being highlighted but the economy and health care never relinquish their grip on the first two spots. Democrats emphasize health care while Republicans highlight the importance of the economy and jobs. Independents, mostly new arrivals and young, focus on the economy as well. Grouping “taxes and spending” with “economy and jobs,” given their economic nature, would give financial concerns the top spot easily. The issue of immigration rises to significance only among the second and third generation, younger voters and the 60-75 age group. The candidate’s position on Cuba comes in dead last.

Figure Cluster 19

Voting Priorities
(entire sample)
Voting While Cuban: Cuban Americans or American Cubans?

Reason given for vote (by migration/born)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economy and jobs</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun control</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes and spending</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just voted for the republican/democrat</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Voting Priorities (by age)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>18-39</th>
<th>40-59</th>
<th>60-75</th>
<th>76 and Older</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economy and jobs</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun control</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes and spending</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just voted for the republican/democrat</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Voting Priorities (voters by party)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economy and jobs</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun control</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes and spending</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just voted for the republican/democrat</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SELECTED TRENDS

How this Poll Compares to Previous FIU Cuba Polls

This section presents a comparison of the responses to key questions from this poll with our previous polls.

Support for the Embargo

Support for the embargo has steadily decreased within the Cuban-American population in the Miami area. During the 1990s, the five polls we conducted tabulated an average of 84% support for maintaining the embargo. Since 2000 to the present, the average support for the embargo over the last eight polls has diminished to approximately 55%. This decline could largely be explained by the incorporation of post-1995 migrants into the population. Figure 20 presents the numbers.

The apparent increase in support for the embargo is a striking feature of this edition of the FIU Cuba Poll. It is difficult to pinpoint a single reason for this but by comparing the 2016 poll with the current poll in more detail, we observe an important dynamic at work: the pre-1979 cohort seems to have changed its mind. As Figure 20a shows, there was an insignificant change in the attitudes of “Other Cuban Americans” towards the embargo between 2016 and 2018, according to the polls. What changed significantly was the attitude of the 1959-1979 migrants, increasing their endorsement of the embargo by over 10%. While only a part of the story, comparing the polls shows the subtlety and fragility of opinions and their measurements.

Figure 20a

Support for Embargo (1997-2018)

Figure 20b

Support for Embargo (2016 and 2018 Polls by 1959-1979 and Other Cuban-American Cohorts)
Support for Unrestricted Travel

Lifting the restrictions on travel to Cuba for all Americans has received increasing support over the years. The five surveys conducted in the 1990s averaged 43% support for lifting travel restrictions, while the eight post-2000 surveys averaged 60% support. The dramatic increase between the 1997 poll and the 2000 poll indicates that the opinions of the post-1995 migrants made a difference on this issue.

![Graph showing support for unlimited travel by all Americans (1997-2018)](image)

Political Party Registration

Although still a majority among Cuban-American voters in Miami, Republican Party registrations have declined over the years while Independents and Democrats have increased. The largest gains have been within the ranks of the Independent voters, which represented over a quarter of the registered voters in the 2018 poll.

![Graph showing political party registration (1997-2018)](image)
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The major conclusion drawn from this poll is that many Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County, particularly those that left Cuba before 1979, are reevaluating their engagement attitudes. It is likely that the reevaluation is influenced by the dramatic change in the narrative towards Cuba adopted by the Trump administration. If this is the case, Cuban Americans are not so much shaping as reflecting U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. Another social force potentially shaping the general shift in attitudes is the unmet expectations, particularly by the pre-1980 migrants, of what a post-Fidel/post-Castro Cuba might look like. After decades of waiting morbidly for the demise of the revolutionary leader, the changes that ensued after his death on November 25, 2016—three months after we conducted the previous FIU Cuba Poll—have been tempered. The initiatives undertaken by Raul Castro when he assumed definitive control of the government in February 2008 generally have been maintained. The new President of Cuba, Miguel Diaz-Canel has, to date, stayed the course, as far as the old guard Cuban-American community can tell. The Obama policy innovations and the grand expectations of change which accompanied them have not delivered any results, according to many Cuban Americans.

Contributing to the deflation of the engagement bubble is the rising hostility against normalizing relations between the two countries by the Trump administration. The Cuban-American population is not immune to the national narratives. It is part of this society and, as much as Cuba remains a source of identity and pride, the members of the community are embedded in the socio-political structure of this society and this South Florida, where all Cuba news is magnified, and its importance often overblown to benefit broader political agendas. The negative national narrative, plus the measured pace of changes taking place on the island, combine to create a less than hopeful view of the future and a more ambivalent attitude about the way forward. These are possible explanations for the shifting attitudes. More analysis is required to make more definitive statements.

Cuban Americans continue to welcome and support many of the changes in U.S. policy since December 2014, such as travel, the maintenance or expansion of limited economic relations and the willingness to allow U.S. citizens to invest in Cuban businesses. Yet, there is a retrenchment of old less conciliatory positions by the old, less conciliatory segments of the community. The major measure of this is the 50/50 split on support for the embargo. As the trend charts make clear, we have to go back to the 2011 poll to see a similar division in the community.

By comparing the results of the current poll with the high optimism for engagement measured in the 2016 poll, we see that the shift reflects a major realignment of the attitudes of the earlier, pre-1979 migrants. (See Figure 20.a). In 2016, the poll, which measured an overwhelming support for lifting the embargo, 45.2% of Cuban Americans not members of the pre-Mariel migration group favored continuation of the embargo. This same category of Cuban American in our current poll support the embargo by 44.5%; an insignificant change in attitude. Meanwhile, the 1959-1979 migrant cohort expressed, in 2016, a 57.2% support for continuing the embargo. This same group of Cuban Americans in this poll report 68.4% support for the embargo; a significant increase of over 10% points.

In the midst of this seeming rebuke of engagement by an important segment of our community, many Cuban Americans continue to welcome and support many of the changes in U.S. policy since December 2014, such as travel, the maintenance or expansion of limited economic relations and the willingness to allow U.S. citizens to invest in Cuban businesses. There are persistent patterns that continue to signal change and point towards a continuation of a demographic and ideological transition—from one dominated by an exile agenda to one dominated by immigrants along with second and third generation Cuban Americans. The poll continues to highlight the various dimensions of the changes based on migrant wave and generational shifts fueled by continued migration from the island and the rising number of Cuban Americans born in the United States. Both of these groups—new arrivals and second/third generations—are more likely to view the U.S. policies developed during the Cold War less favorably than the earlier arrivals.

Older respondents and those leaving Cuba before 1980 as an aggregate are much more committed to the isolation of Cuba from U.S. citizens and businesses. The more recent
arrivals and new generations of Cuban Americans are much more likely to view engagement policies as the best form of bringing about change in Cuba. Many are personally engaged with contemporary Cuban society, especially by traveling to visit friends and relatives, sending remittances, fueling private sector investment, and desiring to do more, not less, on the island.

The mass migration of Cubans to Florida and the United States has been put on hold by the termination of the wet-foot/dry-foot policy and the suspension of consular services at the Embassy in Havana. As recent arrivals become integrated into the democratic processes of their adopted country, voices for changing the current policy become louder. While there seems to be an uptick in citizenship and voter registration activity among the new arrivals, it is difficult to predict how fast additional policy changes will occur.

The data presented in the current poll have significant policy implications:

1. **The split on support for the embargo signals a division in the population.**
   Younger Cuban Americans are more likely to oppose the embargo (65%). Cuban Americans not born in Cuba also support lifting the embargo (60%) as do post-1995 migrants (60%). This suggests that support for the embargo will decrease with the growth of second and third generation Cuban Americans and continued immigration from the island. The population of registered voters is also split, 48% to 52% of those expressing an opinion, in favor of maintaining the embargo. The schism occurs between pre- and post-Mariel cohorts. The former’s reevaluation of engagement policies is the single strongest factor for the shift measured in the entire population.

2. **While holding the embargo in place has the support of 50% of the populations, there is also support for allowing contacts with non-Cuban Americans.**
   Cuban Americans express dedicated support for policies that increase contact between all U.S. residents/citizens, and the Cuban people. Lifting the travel restrictions currently in place for non-Cuban-American citizens receives strong backing by the entire sample 57%, as well as among new arrivals and the second and third generation voters (68% and 69%) and 55% of registered voters. The continuation of “people-to-people” travel also receives strong support.

3. **Cuban Americans express support for measures that maintain or increase commercial relations between U.S. businesses and Cubans.**
   As in previous polls, support for companies selling medicine and food spans all cohorts. Similarly, 68% of the respondents would like to see the existing limited business relations between U.S. and the island either expanded or maintained. Half of Cuban Americans (50%) support opening up options for all Americans to invest in private enterprises on the island.

4. **Current U.S. immigration policies directed at Cubans receive support from some Cuban Americans, opposition from others.**
   The termination of the “wet foot/dry foot” policy receives support from selected groups, but the population as a whole is evenly split on its support for the termination of the wet foot/dry foot policy with 52% supporting termination but the remainder either unsure (8%) or in opposition to its end (41%). Only the pre-1980 migrants and the second and third generations are significantly in favor of the abolition of this policy. Fifty-five percent of registered voters support the policy shift.

5. **Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County continue to have strong ties to friends and relatives on the island.**
   Forty percent report sending money to friends and relatives and 36% report sending other items. Sending remittances is strongest among the new arrivals but traveling to the island is a broadly-based phenomenon.

6. **While remaining staunchly Republican, (54%) younger Cuban Americans and new arrivals are fueling the ranks of the Independent and Democratic Parties.**
   Yet, as the voting section shows, Republicans are still the ones that turn out and make a difference.

7. **A candidate’s position towards Cuba is not a motivating factor in turning out the Cuban vote.**
   Views on health care, the economy and jobs, gun control and even immigration issues are considered as more significant to Cuban Americans when evaluating a candidate.
APPENDIX 1: Methodology

The FIU Cuba Poll has followed the same methodology over the two decades it has been conducted. Random digit dial (RDD) probability sampling is used to reach households, which are then screened for Cuban residents. No additional screening is done, although in earlier polls selection within the household for age and gender representativeness was done. Recently (including the current poll) the mix of landline and cell numbers made that unnecessary and Cuban Americans living in every part of the county have to have an equal probability of being selected. The questionnaire is always structured so that tracking questions occur in a similar context of questions asked before them year-to-year. We consider this poll to be a serious conversation with Cuban-American residents of the county which is why questions that may elicit strong opinions need to be asked in context.

FIU contracted the services of NORS Surveys, Inc., to conduct telephone interviews among Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County. All calls were made from the NORS Surveys central phone location and were time-coded and maintained on computer database. For the current poll, 51,899 phone numbers were dialed from probability based Telephone Consumer Protection Act compliant samples purchased from Scientific Telephone Samples, resulting in 751 cell and 250 landline interviews. Approximately 5% of the calls reached a person in a household and 51% of those households responded to the screen for Cuban residents. Half of those screened identified as Cuban, 20% of whom completed the interview. All interviewers from NORS Surveys in Miami are bilingual, with both English and Spanish questionnaire versions on the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system, 69% of the interviews being completed in Spanish.

Results were weighted by Miami-Dade 2014-2016 American Community Survey (ACS) data on countywide age categories and gender for the Cuban population 18 years and older. This is standard practice in polling since men and women in different age groups have different probabilities of agreeing to be interviewed in a telephone survey. Younger males are somewhat more likely to complete a cell phone survey while the reverse is true for landline. Many households do not use landline phones at all, but on the other hand a number of older residents do not use cell phones. The weights for the age and gender categories are shown below.

It should be noted that, while we use a weighting procedure the same as that of current highly rated political polls, these most accepted weighting procedures only go so far in estimating current opinions of a population on issues where one relatively small group of respondents has strongly different positions than the others. This is the case with respondents to this poll who migrated to Miami-Dade before 1980 and are 76 years old or older. This group represents 16% of the poll sample and about 9% of the current Miami-Dade Cuban population 18 years of age or older.

This difference can be seen if on the key embargo question two groups are compared: respondents who migrated from Cuba between 1959 and 1979 as opposed to all others (Figure 3.e above). Differences in support for continuing the embargo are evident. We can be fairly confident in the estimates even though the groups differ in demographic composition because sample/census age and gender weighting are applied the same way to all three groups.
# Weight Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender and Age</th>
<th>Percent of 2018 Cuba Poll</th>
<th>Percent of Population Persons of Cuban Descent 18 and older in Miami-Dade County 2014-2016 American Community Survey</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men 18-29</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 30-39</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 40-49</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 50-59</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 60-69</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 70-79</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 80 and older</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 18-29</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 30-39</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 40-49</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 50-59</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 60-69</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 70-79</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 80 and older</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0.419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Men vs. Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>Cell</th>
<th>Landline</th>
<th>Cell</th>
<th>Landline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-39</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-75</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76 &amp; older</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: How Were The Questions Asked?

1. Should unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba be allowed or not?
Los viajes sin restricciones de todos los americanos a Cuba ¿deberían ser permitidos o no?

2. Currently, any American can travel to Cuba in People-to-People trips designed to encourage communications among citizens of the U.S and citizens of Cuba. These trips are usually organized for educational, religious, or research purposes. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose or strongly oppose this type of People to People travel?
Actualmente, todo norteamericano puede viajar a Cuba por medio de viajes de pueblo a pueblo, organizados por agencias de viaje y diseñados para fomentar la comunicación entre los ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y los ciudadanos de Cuba. ¿Está Ud. decididamente a favor, bastante a favor, bastante en contra, o fuertemente en contra de este tipo de viaje de pueblo a pueblo?

3. Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not at all?
En términos generales, ¿ cree usted que el embargo norteamericano a Cuba ha dado muy buen resultado, buen resultado, no muy buen resultado o ningún resultado?

4. Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba?
¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que continúe el embargo a Cuba?

5. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba?
¿Está usted a favor o en contra del restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos con Cuba?

6. Over the past few years, people have been talking about the possibility of political changes in Cuba. When do you think that major political changes are likely to occur in Cuba? Would you say within one year, in two to five years, in six to ten years, over ten years, that change is already occurring, or never?
Durante los últimos años se ha hablado sobre la posibilidad de cambios políticos en Cuba. ¿Cuándo cree usted que es probable que ocurran esos cambios políticos en Cuba? ¿Diría usted que dentro de un año, dos a cinco años, de seis a diez años, más de diez años, o piensa usted que los cambios ya están ocurriendo o que nunca ocurrirán?

7. Some U.S. companies have managed to establish limited business relations with Cuba to sell grain, other agricultural products, and medicine. Should this kind of trade be expanded, kept the same or stopped?
Algunas compañías en los Estados Unidos han logrado establecer relaciones limitadas para negociar con Cuba, vendiéndole granos, otros productos agrícolas y medicinas. ¿Debería este comercio expandirse, mantenerse igual, o suspenderse?

8. First, allow companies to sell medicine to Cuba... Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?
Permitir que las compañías vendan medicinas a Cuba, ¿está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?

9. Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba... Do you strongly favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose this?
Permitir que las compañías norteamericanas vendan alimentos a Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?

10. As it stands, all Cubans who enter the United States without the appropriate visa and do not qualify for humanitarian relief are sent back to Cuba. Do you agree or disagree with this policy?
Hoy en día, todos los cubanos que entran a los Estados Unidos sin el visado apropiado y no califican para ayuda humanitaria son enviados de regreso a Cuba. ¿Está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta política?

11. Should unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba be allowed or not?
Los viajes sin restricciones de todos los americanos a Cuba ¿deberían ser permitidos o no?

12. Have you ever traveled to Cuba? ¿Ha viajado a Cuba alguna vez?

13. During the last few years the Cuban government has allowed more of its citizens to start their own small private businesses. Do you think people living in the US should be allowed to invest in these new independent small businesses in Cuba?
Durante los últimos años, el gobierno cubano ha permitido que los ciudadanos inicien sus propias pequeñas empresas privadas. ¿Cree usted que a las personas viviendo en Estados Unidos se les debe permitir invertir en estos nuevos pequeños negocios privados en Cuba?

14. Would you invest in a private business in Cuba if given the opportunity? [asked only of respondents who said people living in the U.S should be allowed to invest in these new independent small businesses in Cuba]
¿Invertiría usted en un negocio privado en Cuba si tuviera la oportunidad?

15. Are you registered as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or with some other party? [asked only of respondents who were U.S. citizens and had registered to vote]
¿Está usted inscrito como republicano, demócrata, independiente o con algún otro partido?

16. Are you a U.S. citizen?
¿Es usted ciudadano norteamericano?

17. Are you registered to vote?
¿Está usted inscrito para votar?

18. Did you vote in the general election this month?
¿Voto en las elecciones generales de este mes?

19. In the election who did you vote for Governor? [INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ NAMES UNLESS NEEDED TO PROMPT]
¿Por quién votó por gobernador?

Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
About Florida International University
Florida International University, a public university located in Miami, has
a passion for student success and community solutions. The university is
classified by Carnegie as “R1.” FIU is among the top 100 public universities
in U.S. News and World Report’s 2019 Best Colleges and 18 academic
programs are individually ranked. FIU was recently ranked as the second best
performing university in Florida and graduates are among the highest-paid in
the state. FIU has multiple state-of-the-art research facilities including the Wall
of Wind Research and Testing Facility and FIU’s Medina Aquarius Program.
FIU has awarded more than 330,000 degrees since 1972 and enrolls more
than 57,000 students in two campuses and centers including FIU Downtown
on Brickell, FIU@I-75, the Miami Beach Urban Studios, and sites in Qingdao
and Tianjin, China. FIU also supports artistic and cultural engagement through
its three museums: Patricia & Phillip Frost Art Museum, the Wolfsonian-FIU,
and the Jewish Museum of Florida-FIU. FIU is a member of Conference USA
with more than 400 student-athletes participating in 18 sports. For more
information about FIU, visit www.fiu.edu

About the Steven J. Green
School of International and Public Affairs
Launched in 2008, the Steven J. Green School of International and Public
Affairs at FIU educates the leaders and changemakers of tomorrow through
innovative teaching and research that advances global understanding,
contributes to policy solutions and promotes international dialogue. One of
the largest schools of its kind in the world, the Green School enrolls more than
7,200 students and employs 200 fulltime faculty. It offers 38 interdisciplinary
degree programs at the bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral levels, as well
as 35 undergraduate and graduate certificate programs. The Green School
encompasses eight signature departments: Criminology and Criminal Justice,
Economics, Global and Sociocultural Studies, History, Modern Languages,
Politics and International Relations, Public Policy and Administration and
Religious Studies. Home to 16 of the university’s most prominent international
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About the Cuban Research Institute
FIU’s Cuban Research Institute (CRI) is dedicated to creating and
disseminating knowledge about Cuba and Cuban Americans. The institute
encourages original research and interdisciplinary teaching, organizes
extracurricular activities, collaborates with other academic units working in
Cuban and Cuban-American studies, and promotes the development of library
holdings and collections on Cuba and its diaspora. Founded in 1991, CRI is
the nation’s premier center for research and academic programs on Cuban
and Cuban-American issues. No other U.S. university surpasses FIU in the
number of professors and students of Cuban origin.